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Abstract 
 
In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the 
first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own 
information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model are its 
simplicity and the robustness of its results. Its weakness is that it is based on three tie-breaking 
assumptions, which according to Banerjee minimise herding probabilities. In this paper we analyse 
the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. Even if the overall 
probability of herding does not change dramatically, the results obtained, which differ from 
Banerjee's are the following: players' strategies are parameter dependent; an incorrect herd could 
be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible. There are, in addition, some several cases where 
available information allows players to find out which action is correct, and so an irreversible 
correct herd starts. 
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1. Introduction 
Banerjee in his analysis tries to demonstrate the hypothesis of ‘herd behaviour’: everyone is doing 
what everyone else is doing, even when his or her private information suggests acting differently. 
The model is a sequential decision-making game with one wining action and three possible 
information states of the Subjects: correct, wrong or no information. Banerjee shows that as soon as 
the first two players choose the same action, all subsequent players will follow them, independently 
from their private information. Such an irreversible queue (“lock-in”) – caused by the individual 
rational behaviour to gain a better information position by looking at what other Subjects are doing 
– may result in a non-optimal equilibrium since the imitated action may be a non-wining one. In 
other words, considering the society as a whole, it might be more efficient if the individuals could 
not observe the actions of other individuals, i.e. have less information when taking their decisions. 
Banerjee’s model has two important features: it has both a very simple and intuitive structure 
and it gives very strong results. Besides the rationality assumption, we suppose that the decision-
making process of each player is based on a set of three tie-breaking rules, indicating what he/she 
has to do in each occasion (e.g. when he/she is indifferent between two or more actions). In other 
words, “each of these assumptions is made to minimize the possibility of herding” (Banerjee, 1992: 
803). It can easily be seen that the rules chosen by Banerjee are not the only plausible ones. In what 
follows, we will therefore examine if there is any critical relation between the tie-breaking rules and 
the overall dynamics of the model. In particular, we will show that by choosing an alternative 
decision rule in case that the first player has no signal, the possibility of an irreversible queue 
starting from the first player is generally smaller, and consequently also the probability of an 
inefficient lock-in. 
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The main goal of this paper is to present some possible extensions to Banerjee’s model, which 
will show the robustness of the original results, as well as the presence of analytical complexities in 
the extended models.  
 
2. “A simple model of herd behaviour” under different assumption sets 
Let A = [0, 1] ∈ R be the set of all possible investments, where only a* ∈ A pays a positive pay-off. 
Let S = [0, 1] ∈ R be the set of all possible signals, where only s* ∈ S signals to invests in a*. The 
aim of the game is to invest in a*. The pay-off is one when action a* is chosen and zero otherwise. 
There is a population of N players who take their decision sequentially and in a fixed order. Each 
player knows the choices made by those before him/her but is not aware of the information on 
which these choices were based on. Furthermore, let α be the probability of receiving a signal and β 
the probability that the signal is correct. 
 
2.1. The original tie-breaking rules 
The decision-making process is based on the following three tie-breaking rules (we will fallow the 
notation adopted by Banerjee and refer to these rules as assumptions): 
Assumption A. Whenever a decision-maker has no signal and everyone else has chosen zero, 
he/she always chooses zero. 
Assumption B. When decision-makers are indifferent between following their own signal or 
someone else’s choice, they always follow their own signal. 
Assumption C. When a decision-maker is indifferent between two or more of the choices 
made by the previous decision-makers, he/she chooses to follow the one who has the highest value. 
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Under these assumptions Benarjee demonstrate that once two subjects choose the same action 
all subsequent subjects will be in a herd irrespectively of their signals and of the game 
parameterizations.  
 
2.2. New tie-breaking rules 
Replacing Assumption A with the following Assumption A1 it is possible to show that the 
dynamics of the model changes. 
Assumption A1. Whenever the first decision-maker has no signal, he/she chooses randomly an 
action from the set of all possible actions. 
The expected pay-off for the subject 1 is zero under both assumptions A1 and A. Under 
Assumption A, however, an action equal to zero is a clear signal for the subsequent players that the 
decision-maker did not receive a signal (since the probability of getting a signal equal to zero is 
zero). Thus, the first player in the sequence who chooses an action different from zero must have 
received a signal. In the case that the subsequent player does not receive a signal he/she will follow 
the choice of his/her predecessor. Since two identical actions are more likely to be correct than 
incorrect, the next player will follow the queue even if he/she receives a signal suggesting acting 
differently, and consequently, all the next players will follow this action. Under Assumption A1 
however, the first player will choose an action different from zero in case he/she has not received a 
signal. Thus, a queue starting from the first player is less informative for the next decision-makers 
than under Assumption A.  
It is possible to show that under this new set of tie-breaking rules (A1, B, and C) it is not 
always the case that, if all previous subjects choose the same action subsequent subjects will follow 
them, independently from their private information. To complete our task the following proposition 
is needed:  
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Proposition 1. If player n gets a signal and he/she can observe a queue of length n-1, following 
the queue would not always be considered the best strategy. 
In this context, two possible cases need to be analysed. 
Case 1: player n-1 gets a signal and his/her best strategy is following the queue. 
Case 2: the best strategy of player n-1 is following his/her signal. 
Under Case 1, Proposition 1 is trivial. It is evident that the best strategy of player n is to follow 
the queue. 
Under Case 2, in order to prove Proposition 1 we need some lemmas: 
Lemma 1. Let us indicate with nΨ  the event ‘player n gets the correct signal and observes an 
incorrect queue of length n-1’. Then 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )12 111Pr −− −+−−=Ψ nnn ααβααβ      (1) 
where αβ  is the probability that player n gets the correct signal, and ( ) ( )( ) 21 111 −− −−+− nn αβαα  is 
the probability of observing a queue of length n-1. 
Proof of lemma 1. The only two cases in which such a queue can be observed are: ‘player 1 
gets an incorrect signal (probability ( )βα −1 ) while all the other players get no signal (probability 
( ) 21 −− nα )’; ‘all n-1 players get no signal (probability ( ) 11 −− nα ). 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2. Let nΦ  be the event ‘player n gets an incorrect signal and observes a correct queue 
of length n-1’. Then 
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where ( )βα −1  is the probability that player n gets an incorrect signal; αβ  is the probability that 
player 1 gets the correct signal; ( ) 2−nαβ  is the probability that all players from 2 to n-1 get the 
correct signal; ( ) ( )ααβ −




 −
− 1
1
2 3nn
 is the probability that all players from 2 to n-1 get the correct 
signal and one of them gets no signal. The proof of this Lemma is similar to the previous one. 
Noting that equation (2) is the Newton expansion of a binomial in the power n-2, it is possible 
to rearrange the equation as: 
   
( ) ( )[ ].1Pr 2−−+=Φ nn ααβαβ       (3) 
Lemma 3. If player n’s best strategy is to follow his/her signal, than it must also be the case for 
player n-k, where +∈ Nkn,  and kn ≥  
Proof of lemma 3. Let player n’s best strategy be following his/her signal. In other terms: 
( ) ( ) .0PrPr >Φ−Ψ nn  So we have: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ,01Pr1111 212 >−+Φ−−−+−− −−− nnnn ααβαββαααβααβ   (4) 
that is equivalent to 
( )( ) ( )( ) .01111 222 >−+−−−− −− nn ααβββαααβαβ      (5) 
We can rewrite equation (5) as: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ;0111111 323 >−+−+−−−−− −− ααβααβββααααβαβ nn    (6) 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) .1
11111 323
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Noting that ( )( ) 01
1
>
−
−+
α
ααβ for all [ ]1,0, ∈βα , it is also true that: 
( )( ) ( )( ) .1111 323 −− −+−>−− nn ααβββαααβαβ       (8) 
We can rewrite the equation (8) as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 01111PrPr 32311 >−+−−−−=Φ−Ψ −−−− nnnn ααβββαααβαβ   (9) 
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that implies that the best strategy of player n-1 is following his/her signal. 
Q.E.D. 
After having defined and proofed the three lemmas above, we can return to Proposition 1. At 
this point, in order to prove Proposition 1, we have to show the existence of α  and [ ]1,0∈β  '∋  one 
of the following conditions is met: 
1. ( ) ( )nn Φ<Ψ PrPr ; 
2.  ( ) ( )nn Φ>Ψ PrPr ; 
3. ( ) ( )nn Φ=Ψ PrPr , i.e. subjects are indifferent between following the queue or their 
private information. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us indicate that ( ) ( ) ( )nn Ψ−Φ=ℑ PrPr, βα . Therefore:  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )..11111, 122 −−− −+−−−−+−=ℑ nnn ααβααβααβαββαβα    (10) 
Without loss of generality, let us assume that x== βα . Equation (10) can then be rewritten as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).111 2222 xxxxxx nn +−−−+=ℑ −−      (11) 
Considering that ( ) 1lim
0
−=ℑ
→
x
x
 and ( ) 1lim
1
=ℑ
→
x
x
, then for 0=x  (respectively 1=x ) 
( ) ( )nn Φ>Ψ PrPr  (respectively ( ) ( )nn Φ<Ψ PrPr ). 
Moreover, the intermediate value theorem guarantees that a value of x 
'∋ ( ) ( )nn Φ=Ψ PrPr exists. 
Q.E.D. 
The first result of our paper, thus, is that the equilibrium decision rule is parameter dependent: 
even if the equilibrium is characterised by extensive herd behaviour, when a queue starts, subjects 
will not always find themselves locked in. In other words, breaking herd behaviour is possible. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this work we extended Banerjee’s model of herd behaviour replacing one of its fundamental and 
‘innocuous’ assumptions. More precisely, we replaced Assumption A (whenever a decision-maker 
has no signal and everyone else has chosen zero, he/she will always choose zero), with Assumption 
A1 (whenever a decision-maker has no signal and everyone else has chosen zero, he/she will 
always choose randomly among all possible actions). 
The consequence of this slight change in the assumptions’ set leads to an important alteration 
in the players’ strategy. On the one hand, in Banerjee’s model two identical actions are enough to 
generate an irreversible queue. This fact results in a loss of information with the consequence of a 
non optimal aggregated result. On the other hand, in the modified model players’ strategies are 
parameter dependent: private information will not be systematically ignored in the presence of a 
queue. 
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